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UNITED STATES V. CHESTER
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Although the Second
Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1791,2 the United States Supreme
Court had not directly addressed the scope of the right conferred by the
amendment until 2008 when it decided District of Columbia v. Heller. In
Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home" 4 and
struck down the District of Columbia's gun laws as violating that right. In so
holding, the Court determined that, rather than securing a collective "right to
possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service," 6 the Amendment
guarantees a "pre-existing right"'7 of private individuals "to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation." The Court was careful, however, to
recognize that the right is not without limits, and it identified several examples of
permissible limitations on gun ownership and use. 9 Additionally, although the
Court stated that an absolute prohibition on firearms kept in the home for self-
defense purposes (e.g., the prohibition included in the District of Columbia laws
being challenged in the case) would fail any standard of scrutiny,10 it rejected use
of the rational basis test and did not specify the appropriate standard under which
lower courts should evaluate gun restrictions." Until recently, the United States
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. Lawrence Delbert Cress, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Origins and Meaning of the
Second Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 55, 65 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987).
3. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The Court stated, "We conclude that nothing in our precedents
forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment." Id. at 2816. On
the other hand, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion emphasizes the Court's decision in United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)-where the Court held that the National Firearms Act, ch.
757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), did not violate
the Second Amendment, Miller, 307 U.S. at 177-78-and argues that the decision interpreted the
Second Amendment to "protect[] the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but
[not to] curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons."
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the majority in Heller takes Justice
Stevens to task for his view, arguing that in Miller "the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for
Second Amendment protection." Id. at 2814 (majority opinion) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
4. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
5. Id. at 2821-22.
6. Id. at 2789. In their separate dissenting opinions to Heller, both Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer discuss collective rights theories of the Second Amendment. See id. at 2822-47
(Stevens, J., dissenting), 2847-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2797 (majority opinion).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 2816-17.
10. Id. at 2817-18.
11. Id. at 2817 n.27 ("If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect."); see also United States v. Skoien, 587
F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Although Heller did not settle on a standard of review, it plainly
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had not addressed Heller in a published
opinion;12 however, last year, in United States v. Chester,13 the Fourth Circuit
held that in cases addressing Second Amendment challenges by defendants
charged with firearm possession after having been previously convicted for a
misdemeanor domestic violence crime, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review.14
William Samuel Chester was convicted in West Virginia state court on
February 4, 2005 for a misdemeanor domestic violence offense after he attacked
his twenty-two-year-old daughter, Meghan Chester, at the family home.15
Several years later, on October 10, 2007, Chester's then-wife, Linda Guerrant-
Chester, called the police after her husband grabbed her face and throat and
strangled her when she discovered him receiving services from a prostitute
outside their home.16 Samantha Chester, the couple's daughter, told Kanawha
County police officers that during the attack she heard Chester repeatedly
threaten to kill her mother.17 While conducting a search of the Chester family
home, police officers found two weapons-a loaded shotgun in the kitchen and a
9mm handgun in Chester's bedroom-which Chester admitted were his.18
Following the incident, in May 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Chester for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) 19 by possessing firearms after being previously
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 20 Section 922(g)(9)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in
any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ... possess
... any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
ruled out the deferential rational-basis test; this leaves either strict scrutiny or some form of
'intermediate' review.").
12. The Fourth Circuit had previously addressed Heller only in unpublished opinions. See,
e.g., United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam)
(upholding a ban on possession of firearms by persons committed to mental institutions); United
States v. Brunson, 292 F. App'x 259 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (upholding a statute prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms).
13. 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).
14. Id. at 683.
15. See United States v. Chester, 367 F. App'x 392, 394 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Chester was convicted for violating a West Virginia Code section, id., that criminalizes domestic
battery and domestic assault against a person's "family or household member," see W. VA. CODE §
61-2-28 (a)-(b) (2010).
16. Chester, 367 F. App'x at 394.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 92 2(g)( 9) (2006).
20. Chester, 367 F. App'x at 394.
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which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
21commerce.
The definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" appears in
§ 921(a)(33)2 and includes any offense that is "a misdemeanor under Federal,
State, or Tribal law; and [that] has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, "committed by a
current or former spouse, [or] parent." 23
Although Chester conceded that his domestic assault and battery conviction
from 2005 constituted a " redicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" for
purposes of § 922(g)(9), 4 he moved to dismiss his indictment on the grounds
that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, § 922(g)(9) was
unconstitutional on its face and as it applied to him.25 The district court denied
Chester's motion, relying on language from Heller stating that "nothing in [the]
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill." 26 Drawing an analogy
between § 922(g)(9) and § 922(g)(1), which prevents any convicted felon from
possessing firearms,27 the district court reasoned that "like the felon
dispossession provision set forth in § 922(g)(1), the prohibition of firearm
possession by domestic violence misdemeanants is a danger-reducing regulation
designed 'to protect family members and society in general from potential
[violence]."' 28  Thereafter, Chester entered a conditional plea of guilty, per
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), reserving the right to argue on
appeal that § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit heard Chester's appeal and, in an unpublished per curiam
opinion, vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case,30 relying
on the approach initially taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien.31 In Skoien, the Seventh Circuit
addressed Heller in the context of a challenge to § 922(g)(9) and concluded that
21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2006).
23. Id.
24. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25. Id.
26. United States v. Chester, No. 2:08-00105, 2008 WL 4534210, at *1-2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct.
7, 2008) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008)).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
28. Chester, 628 F.3d at 677 (alteration in original) (quoting Chester, 2008 WL 4534210, at
*2).
29. Id.
30. United States v. Chester, 367 F. App'x 392, 393-94 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
31. Id. at 397-99 (citing United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-10, 812, 816 (7th Cir.




Hagood: United States v. Chester
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
intermediate scrutiny should be applied in such a case.32 After a thorough
discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Skoien, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the facts surrounding Chester's appeal were similar to those in
Skoien;33 notably, however, the Fourth Circuit took issue with the district court's
failure to determine the level of scrutiny at which to evaluate § 922 (g)(9) or to
"substantively apply" a level of scrutiny to the statute.34 Accordingly, the court
instructed the district court upon remand to determine the "precise contours" of
Chester's constitutional claim35 and to "identify, justify, and apply an
appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny." 36 After the Fourth Circuit issued its
unpublished opinion, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the Skoien
decision, and the government petitioned the Fourth Circuit for rehearing.37
While the rehearing petition was pending, the Seventh Circuit issused its
decision in Skoien, applying intermediate scrutiny to reject a Second
Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9). 38 Thereafter, the Fourth Circuit granted
the government's petition for panel rehearing, and in a published opinion
decided to "vacate [its] initial opinion and reissue [its] decision to provide
district courts in [the] Circuit guidance on the framework for deciding Second
Amendment challenges."39
The issue presented on appeal was whether Chester's conviction under
§ 922(g)(9) for illegal firearm possession unconstitutionally abridged his Second
Amendment "right to keep and bear arms" as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Heller.4 0  After an introductory discussion and analysis of the Heller
opinion,4 1 the Fourth Circuit addressed how to evaluate a challenge to
§ 922(g)(9),42 and articulated a two-step approach.43 The first step determines
"whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee."44 If the law imposes such a
burden, the second step involves applying "means-end scrutiny" to the law.45
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that for claims such as Chester's intermediate
scrutiny is the appropriate standard.46 Because it also found the record
32. See Skoien, 587 F.3d at 805.
33. See Chester, 367 F. App'x at 397-99 (citing Skoien, 587 F.3d at 808-10, 812, 816).
34. Id. at 393-94.
35. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Chester, 367 F. App'x
at 399).
36. Chester, 367 F. App'x at 398.
37. Chester, 628 F.3d at 678.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 674.
41. See id. at 674-76.
42. Id. at 678-79.
43. Id. at 680.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 683.
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UNITED STATES V. CHESTER
insufficient, however, the court once again remanded the case to the district level
to provide the government an opportunity to meet its burden under the newly
adopted intermediate scrutiny standard.47
In his concurring opinion, Judge Davis agreed with the judgment, but
disagreed with the majority's characterization of the issue and its reliance on
First Amendment doctrines in the context of Second Amendment
jurisprudence. 48 Like the Seventh Circuit in Skoien, Judge Davis would have
applied intermediate scrutiny to § 922 g)(9) to determine that Chester's Second
Amendment claim was without merit. Nevertheless, Judge Davis concurred in
the judgment because he concluded that "the district court should have no
difficulty in concluding that the application of § 922(g)(9) to offenders such as
Chester passes Second Amendment scrutiny, exactly as district courts have
already concluded."5 0
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Heller recognized an individual
right to possess and use firearms for purposes unrelated to militia service, the
Court expressly recognized the limited scope of that right. Specifically, the
Court recognized that the protection the Second Amendment confers is limited
based on the type of weapon at issue. 52 For example, "the Second Amendment
does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."53  In addition, the Court
stated:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of
the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
47. See id. The court explained:
Having established the appropriate standard of review, we think it best to remand this
case to afford the government an opportunity to shoulder its burden and Chester an
opportunity to respond. Both sides should have an opportunity to present their evidence
and their arguments to the district court in the first instance.
Id.
48. Id. at 685 (Davis, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 683, 690, 693.
50. Id. at 683.
51. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
52. Id. at 2816-17.
53. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815-16 (2008); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,
91 (3d Cir. 2010) ("The Court made clear that restrictions on the possession of dangerous and
unusual weapons are not constitutionally suspect because these weapons are outside the ambit of the
amendment." (citing Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815-16)).
2011] 561
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buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.54
Thus, another limitation on the scope of the right recognized in Heller is
"presumptively lawful regulatory measures." The Court never explained why
the regulations it listed were "presumptively lawful," however, and lower
57federal courts have recognized that the phrase is susceptible to two meanings.
In the Fourth Circuit's published Chester opinion, it discussed differing
approaches to the "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" language58 and
concluded that a two-step approach to Second Amendment challenges under
Heller would be the most consistent method in light of the decision.59 The
Fourth Circuit rejected the approach of courts that had "treated Heller's listing of
'presumptively lawful regulatory measures,' for all practical purposes, as a kind
of 'safe harbor' for unlisted regulatory measures, such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
which they deem to be analogous to those measures specifically listed in
Heller."60 Because the Supreme Court in Heller had expressly rejected rational
basis review as the level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment claims, 6 1 the
Fourth Circuit determined that such an approach would inappropriately
54. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. See generally Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in
Search ofa Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371,
1371-72 (2009) ("The Court offered no citations to support this statement, and its ad hoc, patchy
quality has been readily apparent to commentators, who have speculated that it was compromise
language designed to secure Justice Kennedy's vote.").
55. Id. at 2817 n.26.
56. Id. at 2816-17.
57. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 ("We recognize the phrase 'presumptively lawful' could
have different meanings under newly enunciated Second Amendment doctrine. On the one hand,
this language could be read to suggest the identified restrictions are presumptively lawful because
they regulate conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment. On the other hand, it may
suggest the restrictions are presumptively lawful because they pass muster under any standard of
scrutiny."); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[I]t is not entirely clear
whether this language should be taken to suggest that the listed firearms regulations are presumed to
fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of the
framing or that they are presumptively lawful under even the highest standard of scrutiny applicable
to laws that encumber constitutional rights.").
58. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
59. Id. at 680.
60. Id. at 679. The district court in Chester took this approach. See United States v. Chester,
No. 2:08-00105, 2008 WL 4534210, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2008).
61. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27. The Court also rejected the "interest-balancing
inquiry" proposed by Justice Breyer in dissent. See id. at 2821 (quoting id. at 2852 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Justice Breyer's formulation, the inquiry
would involve balancing "the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the
governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at
issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter." Id. at 2852 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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62approximate the rejected standard. When courts review government
regulations using some standard other than rational basis review, they apply a
form of heightened scrutiny, and the burden of justifying the challenged
regulation is placed on the government.63 However, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "using Heller's list of 'presumptively lawful regulatory
measures' to find § 922(g)(9) constitutional by analogy would relieve the
government of its burden" and would be inconsistent with Heller.64
In adopting its two-step approach, the Fourth Circuit relied on the reasoning
65of the Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella, as well as that of the
Skoien panel decision66 eventually vacated by the Seventh Circuit en banc. 6 7
Under this approach, the court's first step is a historical inquiry that "seeks to
determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of
the right at the time of ratification."68 Given that Heller described the right to
bear arms as a preexisting right69 and emphasized the importance of historical
understanding of the Second Amendment, the Fourth Circuit's incorporation of
a historical inquiry into its testn seems unsurprising. Under this step, a
determination that the challenged law does not burden conduct historically
considered within the Second Amendment's scope ends the inquiry, and the
challenged law is upheld.72 If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the
burdened conduct is within the scope of Second Amendment protection, the
second step involves applying "means-end scrutiny" to determine whether the
challenged regulation is constitutional.73  Because Heller expressly rejected
rational basis review, 74 "unless the conduct at issue is not protected by the
Second Amendment at all, the Government bears the burden of justifying the
constitutional validity of the law."75
Applying the two-step approach to Chester's Second Amendment challenge
to § 922(g)(9), the Fourth Circuit first evaluated whether someone convicted of a
62. Chester, 628 F.3d at 679. The Fourth Circuit also noted that "the phrase 'presumptively
lawful regulatory measures' suggests the possibility that one or more of these 'longstanding'
regulations 'could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge."' Id. (quoting United
States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010)).
63. See id. at 680.
64. Id.
65. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
66. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), aff'd en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011) (No. 10-7005).
67. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (citing Skoien, 587 F.3d at 808-09; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
at 89).
68. Id.
69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2804 (2008) (stating that the Second
Amendment "was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right").
70. See id. at 2788-2804.
71. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.
75. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.
2011] 563
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misdemeanor crime of domestic violence has the right to possess a firearm in his
76home. For purposes of conducting the historical inquiry into the Second
Amendment's scope, the court noted that "[s]ection 922(g)(9), like the felon-
dispossession provision set forth in § 922(g)(1), permanently disarms an entire
category of persons"77 and framed the issue as "whether a person, rather than the
person's conduct, is unprotected by the Second Amendment." 78 After examining
the historical data regarding whether the Second Amendment was understood to
exclude felons as a class and determining the data to be inconclusive,79 the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the historical evidence regarding whether the
Second Amendment's scope included persons with misdemeanor domestic
violence convictions was similarly inconclusive.80 Moreover, the court noted
that the government was not "contend[ing] that "§ 922(g)(9) [was] valid because
Chester, having been convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor, [was]
wholly unprotected by the Second Amendment."81  Thus, the court declined to
conclude that "the Second Amendment, as historically understood, did not apply
to persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors" and assumed that
"Chester's Second Amendment rights [were] intact and that he [was] entitled to
some measure of Second Amendment protection to keep and possess firearms in
his home for self-defense."82 The Fourth Circuit then proceeded to the next step
of the inquiry and decided on intermediate scrutiny as the standard for Second
Amendment challenges similar to the one Chester raised.83
Although the Fourth Circuit expressly adopted intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate standard to apply in cases involving domestic violence
misdemeanants such as Chester, as a practical matter lower courts in the circuit
are likely to apply intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment claims that fall
in between the core right identified in Heller-"the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home" 84 -and total
bans on firearms possession, such as the District of Columbia's, which would
76. Seeidat680-81.
77. Id. at 680.
78. Id. In his concurring opinion, Judge Davis disagreed with this conclusion. Id at 685
(Davis, J., concurring) ("I do not agree that the issue presented is whether § 922(g)(9), on its face,
properly regulates 'domestic-violence misdemeanants' as a group. This case is only about a
congressional prohibition imposed on Appellant William Samuel Chester, Jr.").
79. See id. at 680-81 (majority opinion) ("[T]he federal felon dispossession provision has
existed in some form or another since the 1930s, and thus there is a much larger body of scholarly
work considering the question of whether felons were originally excluded from the protection
afforded by the Second Amendment [than there is discussing domestic violence misdemeanants].
Commentators are nonetheless divided on the question of the categorical exclusion of felons from
Second Amendment protection.").
80. Id. at 681-82.
81. Id.at681.
82. Id. at 681-82.
83. Id. at 682-83.
84. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
564 [VOL. 62: 557
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fail under any standard of scrutiny. As Judge Sykes explained in the now-
vacated panel decision in Skoien:
The Court . . . conspicuously declined to set a standard of review. We
take all this to mean that gun laws-other than those like the
categorically invalid one in Heller itself-must be independently
justified.
... We know that rational-basis review is out; Heller was explicit
about that. This leaves either strict scrutiny-typically reserved for laws
that classify on the basis of race or restrict certain fundamental rights
and content-based restrictions on speech-or some form of intermediate
* 86scrutiny.
Because Heller speaks of "presumptively lawful" gun regulations, strict
scrutiny would have been inappropriate in such a context. 87 Moreover, as the
Fourth Circuit noted in Chester, courts do not automatically apply strict scrutiny
whenever a regulation implicates one of the rights specifically set forth in the
88 89Bill of Rights. Looking to First Amendment jurisprudence as a guide, the
court concluded that despite Chester's assertion of a right to possess firearms for
self-defense, his conviction of a domestic violence crime (albeit a misdemeanor)
removes him and others like him from Heller's core right; as such, the court
applied intermediate scrutiny.90
Although several variations on the intermediate scrutiny standard exist,91
under the basic formulation that the Fourth Circuit adopted in Chester, the
government bears the burden of showing "a 'reasonable fit' between the
challenged regulation and a 'substantial' government objective." 92 Governments
facing a challenge to a law implicating Second Amendment rights must therefore
be able to assert an important government objective; a legitimate end is not
enough. 93 In the context of claims such as Chester's where the government
85. See id. at 2817-18.
86. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (citing
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 2818 n.27; United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
87. Id. at 811.
88. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682.
89. See id. (quoting Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. at, 813; Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
90. Id. at 682-83.
91. See id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)).
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asserts "the important object of reducing domestic gun violence," 94 the validity
of the challenged regulation may turn on the relationship between the objective
and the means used to accomplish it.95 In Chester, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that although the "government [had] offered numerous plausible reasons why the
disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants [was] substantially related to
an important government goal[,] . . . it [had] not attempted to offer sufficient
evidence to establish a substantial relationship between § 922(g)(9) and an
important governmental goal."96  Thus, it remanded the case "to afford the
government an opportunity to shoulder its burden [under the newly-established
standard] and Chester an opportunity to respond."9 7
Going forward, governments should be prepared to offer evidence sufficient
to establish a reasonable fit between regulations implicating the right to bear
arms and their asserted justifications. Because-other than in extreme cases
such as those involving the use of unusually dangerous weapons on the one
hand, or those implicating the core right identified in Heller on the other-the
historical evidence is likely to be inconclusive, a court's analysis likely will not
end with the first step. Additionally, given the Fourth Circuit's reliance on First
Amendment jurisprudence in adopting intermediate scrutiny to apply to
Chester's claim, lower courts in the circuit are likely to engage in context-
specific evaluations that focus "on the nature of the conduct being regulated and
the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right."98 The closer the
regulated conduct is to the "core right" identified in Heller, the greater the need






98. Id. at 682.
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